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In this study we examine the extent to which firms pass back the cost of pollution regulation 
to workers in the form of lower wages using a unique matched employer-employee dataset 
for Shanghai. The benefits and costs of pollution regulation in China are important topics to 
study as China comes under increasing pressure to move from a single-minded focus on 
energy-driven economic growth to a more balanced approach to economic growth. The 
benefits of such a shift, particularly in terms of health, are relatively well-studied, but the 
costs are less so. The hip-pocket effect of pollution regulation on workers’ wages is 
particularly important given that it is likely to influence public support for a more balanced 
approach. Our main finding is that the reduction in average wages attributable to firms taking 
measures to control for pollution is between 13.8% and 18.8%, all things being equal. 
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 Introduction 
China has had one of the highest rates of economic growth among developing countries for a 
period spanning three decades. However, China has been heavily dependent on dirty-burning 
coal to fuel its high rate of economic growth. China has been the world’s largest consumer of 
coal since 1986, the second largest consumer of electricity since 1995 and the second largest 
consumer of oil since 2002 (BP, 2009). China’s energy efficiency, though, remains relatively 
low (Ma et al., 2009). As a result, China’s carbon dioxide emissions have increased 
dramatically in recent times, such that China is now the second largest gas emitter in the 
world (Auffhammer & Carson, 2008).  The high energy consuming industries in China 
produce the majority of industrial air pollution (Cole et al. 2008). As a consequence, China 
has been described as ‘choking on its own success’ (Kahn & Yadley, 2007). In response to 
concerns about poor air quality and environmental degradation, there is some evidence that 
the Chinese government is reconsidering the costs of an unfettered emphasis on economic 
growth. Environmental protection is a cornerstone of China’s commitment to more balanced 
economic growth, reflected in the Hu-Wen notion of a ‘harmonious society’. China’s 
industrial firms are coming under increasing pressure to curb pollution emissions.  
 
A series of theoretical studies have examined the backward incidence of pollution control 
(Yohe, 1979; Yu & Ingene, 1982; Forster, 1984; Wang, 1990). These studies suggest that 
expenditure on pollution abatement is a cost of production that shifts the supply curve to the 
left. Moreover, firms which spend on pollution abatement will, whenever possible, pass the 
cost on to workers in the form of lower demand for labor and/or lower wages. This paper 
examines the backward incidence of pollution abatement on wages using a unique matched 
employer-employee dataset collected from Shanghai. Specifically, the paper addresses the following question: Who bears the cost of pollution abatement and to what extent do firms 
pass the cost of pollution abatement back to labor in the form of lower wages?  
 
This question is important to address in the Chinese context because China’s strategy of 
growing rapidly through burning coal has been a major reason for the rapid growth in urban 
incomes. Rapid industrial growth has literally lifted tens of millions of people out of poverty. 
If the Chinese government is going to adopt a more balanced approach to economic growth, it 
is important to be aware of the potential costs to labor in terms of lower wages. A more 
balanced growth path has been lauded because of its positive effect on urban living standards 
and the health of the urban populace via reduced pollution levels (Li et al., 2004; World 
Bank, 2007). However, to the extent that the costs of pollution abatement are passed on to 
workers in the form of lower wages, there is also a potential adverse effect on living 
standards. The effect on the hip pocket is also likely to influence the extent to which China’s 
urban workers support a more balanced approach to economic growth. If the cost in terms of 
lower wages is too high, support for balanced growth policies are likely to wane. 
Chinese Context 
China has experienced annual GDP growth of 10% per annum over an extended period. 
China’s energy consumption has expanded, both in terms of volume and growth rate to 
facilitate China’s high rate of economic growth. China’s primary energy consumption was 
2002.5 million tonnes oil equivalent in 2008, with annual growth of 16.8% over the period 
2002-2008 (BP, 2009). China is now the second largest consumer of energy products after the 
United States and it is fast closing on the United States. In 1978, at the start of economic 
reforms in China, China’s share of global energy consumption was 6.3%, while the 
corresponding figure for the United States was 28.6%. In 2008, China’s share of global 
energy consumption was 17.7%, while in the United States it was 20.4% (Ma et al., 2010).   
China’s energy consumption has generated pollution on a large scale. China is the largest 
coal producer in the world. Coal is the major source of energy in China, constituting about 
75% of all energy sources. Coal contributes 90% of China’s sulphur dioxide emissions and 
about 70% of China’s total dust, nitrogen oxide and carbon dioxide emissions (Zhang, 2007). 
China has twice the sulphur dioxide emissions of the United States with some estimates 
suggesting that in the future China’s sulphur dioxide emissions will be up to five times their 
current level. According to the World Bank, China has 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted 
cities. In 2005, only 31 per cent of Chinese cities met national air quality standards and more 
than 75 per cent of water in rivers in China’s urban areas could not be used for drinking or 
fishing (Economy, 2007). The World Bank (2007) estimates that only 1 per cent of China’s 
urban population of 560 million breathe air considered safe in the European Union.   
 
The World Bank (2007) estimates that the health costs of air and water pollution amount to 
4.3 per cent of GDP and the non-health impacts to 1.5 per cent of GDP, making the total cost 
of air and water pollution in China, 5.8 per cent of GDP. According to World Bank estimates 
from the 1990s, the number of annual pollution related premature deaths in China from a 
mixture of outdoor air pollution in large cities, indoor air pollution from inhaling fumes from 
coal-burning stoves and cooking oil as well as cancers and diarrhoea from drinking polluted 
water, were about 400,000 (Toy, 2007). In a preliminary version of the World Bank’s (2007) 
most recent study on pollution in China, it estimated that the annual number of premature 
pollution-related deaths in China are as high as 750,000. While this figure was censored from 
the final version of the World Bank (2007) report, it was openly discussed at the conference 
launching the World Bank study and has been reported in the media (see eg. Kahn & Yardley, 2007; Toy, 2007). China’s air pollution is also held responsible a high prevalence of 
asthma (Watts, 2006) and cardiovascular disease (Kan et al., 2009) in Chinese cities. 
 
As part of the Chinese government’s commitment to more balanced growth, under the Hu-
Wen administration, the State Environmental Protection Authority (SEPA) of China has been 
elevated to full ministerial status. This has empowered SEPA to push for more stringent 
implementation and monitoring of environmental regulations. As a result, SEPA has had 
some success in halting projects that have not undertaken proper environmental impact 
assessments (Zhang, 2007). This said, one problem with environmental regulation in China is 
that while the central government and SEPA profess a commitment to environmental 
protection, these regulations are not always fully enforced at the local level. This is because 
at the local level, officials are rewarded on the basis of meeting GDP targets that do not take 
account of environmental degradation. In 2004, for the first and only time, the Chinese 
government reported figures for Green GDP, which adjusted GDP to reflect the cost of 
pollution. The figures, however, were sobering, with the pollution-adjusted growth rates in 
several provinces being close to zero. The idea of reporting Green GDP in China has since 
been shelved because of strong opposition from local government officials (Kahn & Yardley, 
2007). Local officials were opposed to Green GDP as a concept from the start because lower 
adjusted growth rates reduce their prospects for promotion (Economy, 2006). 
 
However, while local officials are sometimes reluctant to monitor environmental regulations, 
China has a nascent environmental civil society movement. Since the mid-1990s about 3000 
environment oriented non-government organizations (NGOs) have been established in China. 
These organizations, such as the well-known ‘Friends of Nature’ and ‘Global Village of 
Beijing’, primarily focus on raising awareness and hands-on environmental activism (Martens, 2006). Citizen complaints about the environment, expressed on official hotlines 
and in letters to local officials are increasing at 30 per cent per annum and were expected to 
top 450,000 in 2007 (Economy, 2007). There are also an increasing number of political 
demonstrations complaining about the environment. Economy (2007) mentioned one such 
demonstration in 2005 when 30,000 to 40,000 people in Zhejiang province vandalised 13 
chemical plants as part of a protest about air pollution. The Chinese central government 
provides tacit support for this environmental movement as a means of scrutinizing 
environmental protection at the local level, although no criticism of the central government’s 
policies are permissible (Larson, 2007; Martens, 2006; Mol & Carter, 2006).   
 
The data in this study is collected from Shanghai. Shanghai is one of China’s most populous 
and prosperous cities. Situated on the estuary of Yangtze River, facing the East China Sea, in 
2005 Shanghai had a permanent population of 13.8 million people and 5.8 million rural-urban 
migrants (SBS, 2006). Energy use and pollution problems in Shanghai are similar to China as 
a whole. Coal accounts for about 70% of the city’s total energy consumption. Air and water 
pollution is severe in Shanghai (Chan & Yao, 2008) and is associated with several adverse 
health effects (Fang, 1989, Chen, 1994). In a series of simulation studies for Shanghai, Li et 
al. (2004) found the health benefits from pollution reduction would be substantial, relative to 
the direct cost of the investment needed for such initiatives. Similar to other cities in China, 
firms in Shanghai are subject to a mix of formal and informal pollution regulation. Following 
Cole et al. (2008) we define formal regulations as those imposed by SEPA or local authorities 
(‘government regulation’). Wang (2002) and Wang and Wheeler (1999) provide detailed 
discussions of such measures. In contrast to formal regulations, informal regulation occurs 
when communities or China’s civil environmental protection movement regulate firms 
through lobbying and petitioning (‘self regulation’).  
Existing Literature 
This study is related to several strands of literature. One series of studies compute willingness 
to pay for clean air based on wage differentials across cities (see eg. Cropper & Arriaga-
Salinas, 1980).  A second series of studies examine whether there is a wage premium for 
working in pollution intensive industries (Cole et al., 2009).  A third series of studies has 
analysed the extent to which firms shift the burden of mandated social security obligations or 
payroll taxes  back on to workers in the form of lower wages (Gruber & Krueger, 1991; 
Gruber 1994, 1997; Holmund 1983). A fourth series of studies have considered the effect of 
pollution abatement on labor productivity (see eg. Christiansen & Haveman, 1981) 
 
There are few studies that have directly examined the effect of pollution abatement on the 
demand for labor or wages. Berman and Bui (2001) examined the impact of new air quality 
regulations on employment in the affected industries in Los Angeles introduced between 
1979 and 1992. These authors found that these regulations did not, in fact, reduce the demand 
for labor in Los Angeles, but may have increased it. Shadbegian (2005) examined the impact 
of air quality regulations on employment in US manufacturing as a whole using panel data 
over the period 1974 to 1985 and found environmental regulation significantly reduces the 
demand for production workers and non-production workers. Hollenbeck (1979) employed a 
computable general equilibrium model to analyse the effect of restrictions on levels of 
permissible emissions from stationary sources set by the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments in 
the United States. He finds that the Act Amendments have a regressive effect on earnings.   
 
Among related studies for China, China’s energy consumption and its relationship with 
economic growth has been extensively analysed (see Ma et al. 2010 for a survey). Cole et al. (2008) studied the determinants of industrial pollution in China. Wang and Wheeler (1999) 
and Wang (2002) examined the impact of pollution regulation on abatement expenditure for 
Chinese industrial polluters and found that abatement expenditures are responsive to 
pollution regulation. He (2006) and Dean et al. (2009) tested the pollution haven hypothesis, 
which states that foreign direct investment is attracted by weaker environmental regulation. 
He (2006) found support for the hypothesis. Dean et al. (2009) found support for the 
hypothesis for firms from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, but not other countries. Smyth et 
al (2008) examined the impact of pollution on subjective well-being across 30 Chinese cities, 
while Zhai and Suzuki (2008) examined willingness to pay for environmental quality in 
Tianjin. None of these studies, however, are concerned with wages.  In the spirit of the third 
set of related studies mentioned above, Nielsen and Smyth (2008) examined the effect of 
compliance with social insurance obligations on wages in Shanghai. That study found that 
employers which complied with social security obligations in Shanghai passed on part of the 
cost to workers in the form of lower wages. However, these authors did not consider the 
effect of pollution abatement on wages. To summarize, there are few empirical studies that 
have considered the relationship between pollution abatement and either the demand for labor 
or wages of workers and there are no studies that do so using Chinese data. 
Data  
We use a matched worker-firm data set from Minhang district in Shanghai collected by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2007. The dataset, which contains 
information on 784 employees from 78 firms, was selected by Probability Proportion to Size 
sampling according to a list of all manufacturing firms in Minhang district whose annual 
sales were at least 5 million RMB. Once missing data was removed, we had valid data for all 
the variables of interest in the study for about 600 employees and 69 firms. Table 1 gives 
descriptive statistics for the firms in a sample and compares them with descriptive statistics for firms in Minhang District and Shanghai as a whole. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 
suggest that the sample is generally representative of firms in Minhang District and Shanghai.  
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the employees in the sample based on whether the 
respondent worked for a firm that reported undertaking measures to control pollution. These 
pollution measures could be the result of either government regulation or self-regulation. Of 
the 41 firms that had introduced measures to control for pollution, 14 did so in response to 
government regulation and 27 do so as an act of self regulation. Table 2 reports both the gross 
hourly wage rate (including bonuses) for employees in the sample and for all employees in 
the firms that were surveyed. The gross average hourly wage rate of surveyed workers is 
slightly higher than the gross average hourly wage rate of all workers in the firms surveyed. 
However, for both the employees in the sample and for all employees in the surveyed firms, 
wages in firms that reported undertaking measures to control pollution were statistically 
lower than in firms which reported taking no measures to control pollution. This gives some 
initial support for the notion that firms subject to government or self-regulation on pollution 
pass the costs on to workers.  In the wage equations, reported below, while we are primarily 
interested in the effect of pollution abatement on wages, we also control for a range of 
characteristics of the worker. Descriptive statistics for these variables, based on whether or 
not the firm reported undertaking measures to control pollution, are given in Table 2. 
 
Empirical Specification and Methodology 
We employ a Mincer (1974) earnings function in which gross hourly wage earnings including 
bonuses (measured in RMB) is regressed on years of schooling, post-school experience, post-
school experience squared, a dummy variable for whether the firm reported undertaking 
measures to control pollution and a series of control variables. The specific control variables that we employ are gender, marital status, health, household registration status, language 
ability, whether the individual is a member of the Communist Party, the size of the firm for 
which the individual works, proxied by the log of the number of employees, and dummy 
variables for professional certification, occupation and ownership form of the firm. 
 
If firms pass the cost of pollution abatement on to workers we can expect a negative 
relationship between pollution abatement and wages. Turning to the other variables, based on 
human capital theory, wages are determined by investment in human capital. Schooling and 
on-the-job training are major types of investment. Thus, we expect a positive relationship 
between years of schooling and wages. Post-school experience is a proxy for job-training 
investment. We expect the wage-experience profile to follow a parabolic shape in experience.  
Wages will initially increase, reach their peak when human capital is at a maximum and 
eventually fall as human capital depreciation dominates accumulation.  
 
Of the control variables, we expect that individuals with better self-reported health will have 
higher productivity and earn higher wages. We expect that individuals with urban household 
registration will earn more, given that previous studies report evidence of labour market 
discrimination against migrants, who typically have a non-urban household registration (see 
eg. Liu, 2005). We expect that being a member of the Communist Party will command a 
wage premium. Previous studies have found that Communist Party members earn more than 
non-Communist Party members in the Chinese urban labour market (see eg. Appleton et al., 
2002; Li, 2003; Bishop & Liu, 2008). There are two possible explanations. One is that a wage 
premium for Communist Party members could simply be economic rents for a privileged 
group. A second explanation is that the Party can be viewed in much the same fashion as a 
college in Western countries, as a screen for talent, motivation and other personal characteristics correlated with productivity (Bishop & Liu, 2008). The expected sign on 
marital status is ex ante unclear. Individuals who are married might, in a time allocation 
sense, have less time available for work tasks because of family commitments. However, 
marriage can also generate efficiencies through specialisation and the division of labour 
where tasks are divided between spouses, freeing up time (Baker & Jacobsen, 2007). 
Language proficiency is a form of human capital. We expect that individuals with better 
command of Mandarin will earn higher wages. We expect that males will earn more than 
females, given widespread evidence of gender discrimination in earnings in Chinese urban 
labor markets (Zhang et al., 2007). A number of studies suggest that firm size and wages are 
positively correlated (Oi & Idson, 1999). However, previous research suggests that in China 
larger firms, in fact, pay lower wages. The reason for this is that large firms in China employ 
a disproportionate number of blue collar workers (Gao & Smyth, 2010).  
 
Regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with White heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors. Whether the firm undertakes measures to control pollution is 
potentially endogenous. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (augmented regression tests) for 
endogeneity was performed employing a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the firm 
implemented measures to address pollution because it was subject to government regulation 
and set equal to zero if it was acting as a form of self-regulation as the instrumental variable. 
Cole et al. (2008) found that government regulation is an important determinant of industrial 
pollution in China. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggested that the dummy variable 
denoting whether the firm undertakes measures to control pollution was exogenous. 
 
A potential problem with the OLS estimates of the earnings function is the omission of an 
individual’s ability, which may bias the OLS estimates of returns to schooling. The OLS estimator has two ability biases relative to the average marginal return to education: one 
attributable to the correlation between schooling and the intercept of the earnings function, 
the other attributable to the correlation between schooling and the slope of the earnings 
function (see Card, 1999 for a review of the literature focused on ability biases). OLS may 
overestimate returns to schooling due to positive correlation between schooling and ability. 
Alternatively, OLS estimates may underestimate rates of returns to education due to 
heterogeneity among individuals in returns to schooling.  While acknowledging these 
estimation issues, this study applies OLS because the dataset does not contain any appropriate 
instrumental variables for schooling, such as parent’s education or spouse’s education, and 
because estimating the returns to schooling is not the prime focus of the study. 
 
Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the Mincer (1974) earnings function. We present four 
alternative specifications in which different combinations of the dummy variables for 
certification, occupation, ownership and position are included. The results suggest that, 
depending on the specification, for those individuals surveyed hourly wages were between 
1.4 RMB per hour and 1.9 RMB per hour lower in firms which reported implementing 
measures to control pollution. For those who have a 48 hour working week, which is the 
official working week in China, this amounts to between 67.2 RMB and 91.2 RMB per week. 
For those who work a 60 hour working week, which is the official working week plus the 
maximum overtime allowed by law, this equates to between 84 RMB and 114 RMB per 
week. Given that the average hourly wage for surveyed individuals was 10.1 RMB per hour, 
the results imply between a 13.8% and 18.8% reduction in the average hourly wage for those 
individuals in firms which reported implementing measures to control pollution.   
Of the other variables, for each additional 1% in the number of employees, the hourly wage is 
about 1 RMB lower (roughly 1% lower). Each additional year of schooling equates to an 
additional 1-1.1 RMB per hour. Males earn 2-2.4 RMB per hour higher than females. There 
is a wage premium for being married and being a member of the Communist Party. Married 
individuals earn 1.5-1.6 RMB per hour more than those who are single, while Communist 
Party members earn 1.8-2.1 RMB per hour higher than those who are not members of the 
Communist Party. To put the cost to workers of firms implementing pollution controls in 
perspective, based on the upper bound estimate of 1.9 RMB per hour in Specification 4, the 
returns to working in a firm which does not implement measures to control pollution, relative 
to one that does, is roughly equivalent to the returns to being a member of the Communist 
Party (1.8-2.1 RMB per hour) or two additional years of schooling (2-2.2 RMB per hour). 
 
As a robust check on the pollution abatement variable in Table 3, in Table 4 we examine the 
effect of implementing measures to control for pollution on the average hourly wage rate in 
the firm using data at the firm level. Specifically, we regress the average hourly wage in the 
firm on a dummy variable denoting whether the firm implemented measures to control for 
pollution, the log of firm size, the proportion of female workers in the firm, the ratio of blue 
collar workers in the firm, the profit to sales ratio in the firm and ownership dummy 
variables. The results suggest that, depending on the specification, the average hourly wage 
for all workers in the firm is between 1 RMB per hour and 1.1 RMB per hour lower in firms 
which reported implementing measures to control pollution. Given that the average hourly 
wage across firms in the sample was 8.4 RMB per hour, this equates to between 9.2% and 
11.9%, which is similar to the lower bound estimate of 13.8% from the Mincer equation. 
 Conclusion 
In spite of several theoretical studies suggesting that firms will pass the cost of pollution 
regulation back to workers in the form of lower demand for labor or lower wages, there is 
little empirical evidence on the backward incidence of pollution regulation. This is 
particularly true for the effect of pollution regulation on wages. The reason for the lack of 
empirical evidence is probably the relative scarcity of matched employer-employee data 
which also contains information on whether the firm implements measures to control for 
pollution. In this study we have examined the extent to which firms pass back the cost of 
pollution regulation to workers in the form of lower wages using a unique matched employer-
employee dataset for Shanghai. The benefits and costs of pollution regulation in China are 
important topics to study as China moves from an unfettered focus on energy-driven 
economic growth to a more balanced approach. The benefits of such a shift, particularly in 
terms of health, are relatively well-studied, but the costs are less so. The hip-pocket effect of 
pollution regulation on workers’ wages is particularly important given that it is likely to 
influence support for a more balanced approach among the urban populace. Our main finding 
is that in those firms which undertake measures to control for pollution, whether it be as a 
result of government regulation or self-regulation, the reduction in average hourly wages 
attributable to controlling for pollution is between 13.8% and 18.8%, all things being equal.  
 
The study has some limitations that could be addressed in future research. First, while 
Shanghai is a major Chinese city that is, in many ways, representative of other major cities in 
China in terms of its energy use and pollution problems, our data is for a single city. Future 
research is needed for other cities in China including, where possible, multiple cities in the 
one study. Second, our dataset is limited in the sense it does not have appropriate 
instrumental variables for years of schooling. Thus, we need to be cautious about comparing the effect of pollution regulation on wages with the effect of years of schooling on wages 
because the estimate for the latter might be biased. Future research could potentially use data 
with a broader set of instrumental variables. Third, our dataset is cross-sectional. It would be 
interesting to examine the effect of pollution regulation on wages over time using panel data. 
Fourth, we have measured pollution abatement using a dummy variable denoting whether the 
firm implemented measures to control pollution. Future studies could potentially use actual 
expenditure on pollution, which is likely to provide more precise estimates. 
 
Table 1 Representativeness of the sample 





























Years of Schooling  11.72  11.22  11.35 
Experience  14.76  17.11  16.49 
Male (%)  45.32  56.80  53.83 
Married (%)  75.37  74.48  74.71 
Speak Manadarin well(%)  71.78  61.79  64.37 
Good Health (%)  76.85  79.18  78.57 
Urban Hukou (%)  55.45  56.72  56.39 
Member of Communist Party (%)  4.43  12.85  10.65 
Member of Trade Union (%)  34.72  37.82  37.01 
Occupation (%)      
Professional/Technician  25.76  20.66  22.01 
Producer/Transporter  24.75  23.58  23.89 
Service Worker  17.17  15.17  15.70 
Equipment Operator  32.32  40.59  38.39 
Professional Certification (%)     
No Title  79.50  78.16  78.51 
Elementary Certification  13.00  14.38  14.03 
Junior/Senior Certification  7.50  7.45  7.46 Ownership Form of Firm (%)      
State/Collective Owned Firm ‐   11.88  8.80 
Share holding/Public firm  24.63  34.25  31.76 
Foreign/Taiwan/HK JV Firm  60.10  33.22  40.18 
Private Firms  15.27  20.65  19.26 
Number of Respondents  203  581  784 











‐1.611** ‐ 1.386** ‐ 1.425** ‐ 1.924*** 
  (‐2.449)  (‐2.070)  (‐2.111)  (‐2.806) 
Ln(Firm Size) ‐ 0.903*** ‐ 1.013*** ‐ 1.031*** ‐ 0.951*** 
  (‐3.202)  (‐3.534)  (‐3.570)  (‐3.211) 
Education  1.141***  1.104***  1.069***  0.962*** 
  (8.378)  (8.073)  (7.563)  (6.355) 
Experience  0.130  0.142  0.132  0.118 
  (1.239)  (1.351)  (1.250)  (1.095) 
Experience
2 ‐ 0.00321 ‐ 0.00327 ‐ 0.00310 ‐ 0.00330 
  (‐1.402)  (‐1.431)  (‐1.352)  (‐1.417) 
Male  2.261***  2.374***  2.315***  2.043*** 
  (3.810)  (3.992)  (3.859)  (3.219) Married  1.466*  1.586*  1.556*  1.641* 
  (1.715)  (1.855)  (1.815)  (1.875) 
Good Health ‐ 0.459 ‐ 0.486 ‐ 0.479 ‐ 0.338 
  (‐1.197)  (‐1.259)  (‐1.232)  (‐0.851) 
Speak Mandarin Well ‐ 0.135 ‐ 0.184 ‐ 0.213 ‐ 0.191 
  (‐0.195)  (‐0.266)  (‐0.305)  (‐0.271) 
Communist Party Member  2.104**  2.120**  2.043**  1.777* 
  (2.176)  (2.187)  (2.066)  (1.747) 
Urban Hukou  0.187  0.134  0.131  0.436 
  (0.264)  (0.190)  (0.184)  (0.597) 
Member of Trade Union ‐ 0.0217  0.225  0.213  0.0440 
  (‐0.0345)  (0.348)  (0.325)  (0.0649) 
Ownership Dummies?  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Certification Dummies?  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Occupation Dummies?  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Position Dummies?  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Constant  0.172  0.140  0.877  2.876 
  (0.0678)  (0.0514)  (0.316)  (0.935) 
      
Observations  605  605  602  569 






VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Firm Takes Measures to Control Pollution ‐ 0.987* ‐ 1.096* ‐ 1.136* 
  (‐1.802)  (‐1.855)  (‐1.852) 
Ln(FirmSize)   0.497  0.408 
   (1.555)  (1.220) 




Ratio of Blue Collar Workers   ‐ 3.325* ‐ 3.465* 
   (‐1.894)  (‐1.914) 
Ownership Dummies  NO  NO  YES 
Constant  8.997***  9.897***  10.82*** 
  (21.32)  (6.258)  (5.230) 
Observations  69  61  61 
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